claim ed his w ork to be in d ep en d e n t of concepts and beliefs. Epistemologically this is incom patible. In our century, w here Christianity needs to be reinterpreted in the light of m odern science, Schleierm acher has left us with a herm en eu tical challenge to com m unicate the dynam ic experience of a relatio n sh ip with G od in an in tellig ib le way. T h e a u th o r arg u es th a t system atic theology's obligation to rationality must at least include a dialectic interplay o f in terp re tativ e schem es, events and experience.
Communication is sha/ing the wonder o f experience with other people.
Therefore I am dedicated to com municate throu^i music.
Leonard Bcmstcin (70th Anniversary Concert 1989: Boston Symphony Orchestra)
For the past two centuries, the issue of 'religious experience' has been central to the work of religious thinkers and scholars of religion. The late eighteenth and the early years of the nineteenth century, especially, figure prominently as the period in which the desire originated for an accurate description and explanation of that experience
• This paper was read at a post-graduate seminar on 'Understanding Religious Experience' at the University of Port Elizabeth in October 1989.
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Faith, language and cxpcricncc (Proudfoot 1985:xi, 1; cf 196-198) .
T he em ergence of the concept of religious experience and its centrality for religious thought stem s largely from the work of the G erm an theologian Friedrich Schleierm acher (1768-1834), w ho m erited the title 'P ioneer of m odern theology' (C lem ents 1987:7). T he explicit aim of his first book On religion -speeches to the cultured am ong its despisers (published in 1799), was to free religious doctrine and practice from dependence on metaphysical beliefs and ecclesiastical institutions for th eir ju stificatio n , and to ground them in hum an experience (cf H eb b leth w aite 1972:264). S ch leierm ach er w rote this book to convince his friends and fellow m em bers of a circle o f R om antic artists, poets, and Berlin critics that their sensi bilities w ere m ore in tune with the genuine spirit of religious life than much that went on in churches and synagogues. Schleierm acher's concept of religion was inspired and shaped, inter alia, by the pietistic (M oravian) tradition that nurtured him (cf Proudfoot 1985:224-227) , as well as by the world of the Enlightenm ent (the 'Age of R eason') into which he was born, and against which he took a firm stand. Twenty-two years after his first book, he w rote another (for the proposed union of the L utheran and R eform ed churches in
Prussia): The Christian Faith: Presented systematically according to the fundam ental doctrines o f the Evangelical Church.
In the second book he provided a more careful statem en t of the relatio n betw een religious d octrine and experience (Proudfoot 1985:xiii, 16, 31, 238) .
Schleierm acher was the earliest and most systematic proponent to appreciate religion as an autonom ous and in d ep en d en t m om ent of experience with its own integrity -'the im m ediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infin ite' (C lem ents 1987:24, 36) . This is a m om ent which is irreducible to science or morality, belief or conduct, and in principle invulnerable to rational and moral criticism. Any attem pt to assimilate (the essence of) religion in scientific or moral paradigms, o r any other nonreligious phenom ena, would be an attem pt to reduce it to something other than it is. For Schleierm acher reductionism would thus be the chief e rro r to be avoided in the study of religion (P ro u d fo o t 1985:xiv, 2-3,6, 9, 233).
His ascription of religion to the realm o f feeling m arked the sta rt of m odern P rotestantism 's habitual em phasis on the knowledge o f G od as being inward and experiential. It was actually part of a whole new (relational) anthropology of human existence, in which he offered 'a positive, new vision of what it is to be truly human, in a wholeness, richness and freedom not known by the pa.ssing wisdom of the age' (Clem ents 1987:36,37) .
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HTS 46/3 (1990) T he opening c h ap te r o f P ro u d fo o t's book Religious Experience (which is the focal point of this paper) is an exam ination and criticism of Scleierm acher's theory o f religious experience, with particular attention being given to his claim that it is in d e p e n d e n t of concepts and b eliefs, as well as to his acco u n t o f th e way th a t experience is expressed in language.
E Mouton
T H E D ISTIN C TIV E CH A R A C T ER O F R E U G IO U S E X P E R IE N C E Schleierm acher was concerned to show the distinctive character o f religion, and to p re s e n t it in its m ost o rig in a l form . U n lik e o rth o d o x C h ris tia n s, Jew s and Enlightenm ent critics who depicted religion as 'a system of beliefs or doctrines or as a m oral code prescribing behavior' (Proudfoot 1985:2; cf C lem ents 1987:8-15) , he first wanted to show that the religious com ponent in experience has its own integrity, by p resen tin g an accu rate descrip tio n o f th e religious consciousness itself. He w anted to show th e artists and critics with w hom he asso ciated th a t w hat they despised was not religion, but the dogmas and institutions that result from mistaking external forms for the inner life of the spirit.
Secondly, S ch leierm ach er hoped th a t by p resen tin g religion in its original, characteristic form, he would dem onstrate the inapplicability of the E nlightenm ent's criticism of religious belief, and especially of Im m anuel K ant's contention that our experience is structured by the categories and thoughts we bring to it (cf H ebblethwaite 1972:266; Clem ents 1987:10,11).
For Schleierm acher 'descriptive accuracy is to be obtained and reductionism is to be avoided by insisting on the im m ediacy o f religious experience, and on its radical independence from beliefs and p ractices. It is a m om ent in hum an ex p erien ce which rem ains u n stru ctu red by, though it is expressed in thoughts and actions' (Proudfoot 1985:3) . Proudfoot (1985:3, 11, 228, 229, 233) Schleierm acher also resisted K ant's identification of religion with m orality (in term s o f reason). In doing so he gave priority to the religious affections. In this way he c o n trib u te d to a tra d itio n in w hich relig io u s ex p erie n c e as affective experience, and differentiated from both intellect and will, would be regarded as the original and characteristic form of religion. In this tradition scholars like W illiam Jam es and R udolf O tto would at least agree that the original and characteristic form of religion is a pious consciousness, a sense or feeling th at is not to be identified w ith eith er b elief or practice (P roudfoot 1985:7; cf C lem ents 1987:36-40, 66-107) .
T H E PR IO R IT Y O F T H E A FFEC T IV E M O D E
In his b ook On Religion S ch leierm ach er id en tifies tru e religion as a sense, an affectio n, an in tu itio n , a taste for th e Infinite (P ro u d fo o t 1985:9-11; C lem ents It is directly experienced, not shaped by thought, and is raised above all erro r and misunderstanding (Proudfoot 1985:10-12) .
But while Schleierm acher contends that religious experience is im m ediate and in d ep en d e n t from thought, this experience includes an intuitive and intentional com ponent whose object is the Infinite (cf C lem ents 1987:37). H e keeps on saying th a t it is not d ep en d e n t on concepts and beliefs, yet it can be specified only by reference to the concept of the Infinite. This combination is an impossible one: 'If 348 HTS 46/3 (1990) the feeling is intentional, it cannot be specified apart from reference to its object and thus it cannot be independent of thought' (Proudfoot 1985:11; cf 13, 32-36, 237 footnote 7). A ttitudes, em otions, and beliefs are intentional and always directed toward objects. A thought is always a thought of something. Schleierm acher thinks that he has identified a m om ent of consciousness independent o f thought and yet still having cognitive significance. In actual fact his claim functions as a protective strategy which preclud es any conflict betw een religious b elief and the results of scientific inquiry (Proudfoot 1985:199-209, 233 ).
S ince p iety is an im m e d ia te sen se, S c h le ie rm a c h e r a rg u e s, it c a n n o t be understood by description but only by acquaintance, by discovery in oneself (cf Hick 1969:20-22, 26) . T herefo re Schleierm acher would direct his listener or read er to such a particular mom ent in his or her own experience (Proudfoot 1985:11-12; cf 36-37) . The word 'experience' by definition implies a first hand, personal acquaintance o f something. The word itself is derived from the Latin verb 'experior', meaning try, prove, put to the test, the state of being consciously affected by an event (H ebblethwaite 1972:265). F or S chleierm acher the study of religion and religious th ought ought to be approached as the attem pt to describe that experience through an examination of its expressions. O ne of his criteria for identifying an experience as religious is that it be caused or produced by God. 'The sum total of religion is to feel that our being and living is a being and living in and through G o d ' (S ch leierm ach er, as q u o ted by Proudfoot 1985:14) . A second criterion for identifying the religious consciousness includes reference not only to concepts but also to a specific belief about how the experience is to be explained, in spite of Schleierm acher's insistence that religious ideas be restricted to descriptions of religious affections.
T o sum m arise, one can say th at S ch leierm ach er's account of religion as an affective state has two com ponents. First, that ideas and principles are foreign to religion (which is rather a m atter of feeling), distinct from and prior to concepts and b eliefs, in o th e r w ords p re-linguistic, p re-re fle ctiv e and th e re fo re irre d u c ib le (Proudfoot 1985:22, 23, 31) . Second, he identifies piety as a sense and taste for the Infinite, an identification that requires reference to G od, and which also assumes a ^adgment that this feeling is the result o f divine operation. According to Proudfoot (1985:15, 32, 33) these components are incompatible: 'Piety cannot be independent of concepts and beliefs and at the sam e tim e an intentional state th at can only be specified by referen c e to objects o f thought and ex planatory claim s'. S chleier m acher has m istaken a felt sense of im m ediacy for a g u aran tee th a t piety is not formed or shaped by thought or inference (Proudfoot 1985:36; cf 211 The interpretation is not just read off the experience however, as if experience w ere, in itself, authenticating. Any particular experience, if it is claim ed to be an experience of God, can only be identified as such w ithin the whole fram ew ork of interpretation which a given religion provides. In fact, in the case of Christianity it is th e already in te rp re te d fact o f Jesu s C h rist th a t p rovides th e c rite rio n for identifying a specifically Christian experience of God (H ebblethw aite 1972:267, 269; cf Van Huyssteen 1986:155,160-162; Hick 1969:32, 33 ).
In On Religion Schleierm acher gives a rom antic account of religion which had its roots in eighteenth-century pietism , but had not been given a clear intellectual formulation in that context. H e incorporates the insight of the pietists that religion is chiefly a m atter of the heart, of the affections. But this thesis provides no criteria for distinguishing betw een m ore o r less adequate theological form ulations. If the essence of piety consists in the im mediate relation of the self to the Infinite, how can religious doctrine be critically assessed? (Proudfoot 1985:15, 16 ).
Schleiermacher addressed this question in his later work. The Christian Faith, in which he developed a new theological m ethod. His most im portant contribution, according to Proudfoot (1985:16) , was to describe the task of systematic theology as 'the science that systemizes the doctrine prevalent in a particular comm unity at a specific tim e'. But w hat is th at doctrine if it is not a collection of beliefs? 'The subject m a tte r of theology is n e ith e r G od nor evidence o f divine creatio n and governance in the worid but the self-consciousness of the religious believer in the context o f his or her comm unity' (P roudfoot 1985:16; cf C lem ents 1987:37) . The th eo lo g ian is an em piricist, says S ch leierm ach er, and his aim is to p rovide an accurate account of the religious affections within a particular community.
'Religious communities, like individuals, are characterized by their own peculiar 350 h TS 46/3 (1990) states of affection. These states are expressed in prim ary religious language, which is the relatively un-self-conscious language o f hymns, prayer, personal journals, and preaching. T he theologian examines this primary language for its coherence and its clarity in expressing the religious affections of that community. H e then systemizes it in the secondary language of his discipline' (Proudfoot 1985:16) . Piety so defined, however, is certainly not independent o f concepts and beliefs.
T o say th at the religious person is conscious o f being absolutely d ep e n d e n t is to attribute to him or her some rather sophisticated concepts and beliefs, including the concept of com plete depen d en ce, as well as th a t of som e source on which he is totally dependent. The concept of total dependence assumes at least the concept of G od. T he content of the concept of G od, says Schleierm acher, is derived from the im m ediate m om ent of consciousness, rath er than the religious consciousness being derived from or shaped by the concept of God. The word G od presupposes an idea th at is 'nothing m ore than the expression of the feeling o f absolute d ep en d en ce' (Proudfoot 1985:20, 21; cf 31-32) . In Schleierm acher's view, that would at the same tim e m ean th a t G od tak es th e in itiativ e in im p artin g faith and new life to the believer (cf C lem ents 1987:55). Religious experience is thus considered the origin of religious beliefs and practices, and of models and theories in theology, in which it
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Faith, langnagr'. and ezpcricnoc finds its expression, and not vice-versa.
Against this, H ebblethw aite (1972:271; cf 275) would argue that 'doctrine is not rightly understood in term s of som e original experience, but in term s o f its ability as a rationally structured system to make sense of the actual relation betw een G od and m an', th at is, to in te rp re t experience in a dynamic way. This can obviously only happen w hen the particu lar fram ew ork o f in terp retatio n (still) com m unicates life and meaning.
A lthough Schleierm acher does disclaim any attem p t to practise natural theo logy, many have criticised him for equating religious experience with a subjective feeling th a t has no cognitive co m p o n en t and which may even be a p erso n al or 
R E U G IO U S lA N G U A G E AS EXPRESSION
A n integral p a rt o f S chleierm ach er's program m e is the assim ilation o f religious language to natural and spontaneous expression (P roudfoot 1985:30) . His oppo sition to reductionism enters his claim that the religious mom ent in consciousness is original. By that he m eans that (1) it can be accurately described only as a feeling of absolute dependence; and (2) it is not an artefact of the constructive activity of the mind, and is not dependent on concepts, thoughts, or cultural representations of any kind. Religious language derives from the distinctive m om ent of im m ediate selfconsciousness, and is to be explained by reference to the religious affections, and 352 HTS 46/3 (1990) not vice-versa (Proudfoot 1985:23,30-31) .
In Schleierm acher's theory of religious language the expressive function o f the language is dom inant, in so far as it expresses the peculiar piety that is distinctive of a p a rtic u la r religious com m unity. In his On Religion he (q u o ted by P ro u d fo o t 1985:16) said: 'Christian doctrines are accounts of the religious affections set forth in speech'. B ut before undertaking to describe and systematise the affections o f a p a rticu lar religious com m unity, one m ust clarify how religious affections a re set forth in speech, and how language expresses the self-consciousness of an individual or community (Proudfoot 1985:17, 24) . Schleierm acher addresses these questions directly in The Christian Faith. He offers a theory by which religious language is to be in terp reted and explained by reference to the religious affections of which it is the expression. Primary o r original religious language for him is an extension of natural expression. According to him feelings can d eterm in e speech in e ith e r of two ways: by m anifesting them selves naturally and spontaneously in language, or by em ploying language in reflection upon o n e's m ental state. The first is a natural expression of piety in speech, the second a figurative expression, indicating its object in an indirect v/ay (Proudfoot 1985:24, 32) . T he cen tral thesis of S chleierm acher's d o ctrin e is that religious language is determ ined by the religious affections and not by antecedent thought. The emotions spontaneously manifest themselves in language. All religious emotions will at some stage manifest themselves outwardly in the most im mediate and spontaneous way by m eans o f facial fe a tu re s and m ovem ents of voice and g estu re (i e n o n-verbal language), which he regards as their expression. 'In fact, religious affections may be expressed in sacred signs and symbolic acts...without words or thoughts having been associated with them at all. They are independent of concepts and thoughts, though they naturally express themselves in language' (Proudfoot 1985:25) . A ccording to A lston (1965:15-34) , these kinds of 'expression' would not be regarded as an adequate and reliable expression of religion. He argues that non verbal utterances like squeals, looks, and tones of voice do not express feelings in anything like the sense in which they are expressed verbally by interjectio n s or declarative sentences in the first person, present tense. In term s of his distinction betw een regularities and rules, he would rath er say that non-verbal comm unication shows, dem onstrates, evinces, manifests o r betrays (indicates) a certain feeling, but that it does not necessarily express it.
My conclusion from A lston's very m eaningful article is th at expression as a verbal o r non-verbal utteran ce of religious feeling can only be valid and reliable (according to the 'rule' of Scripture) when these two (words and deeds) correspond background, h is/h er ability to express himself, on the situation/context, and on the sensitivity of the hearer/observer.
Schleierm acher further contends that two forms of primary and original speech can be identified in every religious community: the poetic and the rhetorical. Poetic language results from the natural expression of a mental state, in which the im petus for expression com es strictly from w ithin; rh e to ric a l lan g u ag e is elicited by a stim ulus from w ithout. Prim ary religious language includes both. A third type, namely didactic language, is derivative and secondary, and results from the attem pt to com prehend w hat is given in a d irect way in the poetic and rhetorical forms.
T hese th ree types of speech co m p lem en t one a n o th e r in the expression o f the underlying religious self-consciousness (C lem ents 1987:134-135). But, Schleier m acher concludes, th e au th o rity of d o ctrin al p ro p o sitio n s stem s only from the religious consciousness that they express and represent (Proudfoot 1985:25, 26) .
Schleierm acher has thus offered a theory of religion in which religious language and practice are derived from religious experience conceived as feeling, and not the other way around. In other words, he claims that the common elem ent in religious experience is the feelin g o f ab so lu te d ep en d en ce. But, as we have seen, th a t necessarily includes reference to a co-determ inant ('a stim ulus from w ithout') of that feeling, a 'w hence' that is the source of the religious use of the term 'G od'. For him this experience is im m ediate, original, and underived -in d ep en d e n t of any concepts and beliefs.
To m aintain this independence, the distinctive ch aracter of doctrine must be p ro d u ced by th e re lig io u s c o n scio u sn ess. S c h le ie rm a c h e r c a n n o t allow the possibility that the common elem ent in religious experience itself derives from or is essentially dependent on som ething else -like the language employed to express it.
W ere th at the case, the descriptive and explanatory priority he attrib u tes to the religious consciousness would be compromised. H e wants to avoid a reduction of the feeling of absolute dependence either by descriptions of that feeling which omit reference to its codeterm inant, or by purported explanations of piety which portray it as consequent upon a n tec ed en t concepts and beliefs (P roudfoot 1985:30, 31) . This seems to be incompatible.
From a tw entieth-century perspective we realise th at the w onder of religious exf>erience can only be expressed, described and explained in term s of m etaphorical and relatio n al language, which necessarily depends on the sym bolic ability and linguistic fram ew ork of the one experiencing (cf M cFague 1982:1-66; Van Huys-354 h TS 46/3 (1990) E U outon S t e e n 1986:151-168). M etaphorical faith language refers to a Reality -which lies beyond our intellectual grasp -in a way that is not only expressive, but also explains (in a reliable though provisional way) that which has been experienced (V an Huyssteen 1986:158-163,176) . (Proudfoot 1985:31-34, 43) .
Schleierm acher's thesis that religious language is grounded in and continuous
with the natural expression of inner states is indeed a complicated one. H e attem pts to associate religious language with non-linguistic phenom ena, yet claims that it can develop naturally to such a point th at it can be considered an account o r in te r p re ta tio n o f religiou s consciousness. H e w ants to show th a t th e language of religious b elief and doctrine em erges from the religious affections, w ithout being contam inated, and it is thus reduced by thoughts and claims about the world, which might m ake it vulnerable to philosophical criticism . T he link betw een the direct utterances of the religious m om ent and religious language is thus not a logical or gram m atical one, b ut a causal one. H is th eo ry of the expressive c h a ra c te r of religious language is thus m eant to be an explanation o f the em erg en ce of th at language (Proudfoot 1985:34,38) .
For Schleierm acher religious statem ents would not be true o r false in the same sense th a t e ith e r scientific o r philo so p h ical sta tem e n ts are (cf H e b b le th w a ite 1972:267), b u t they can be assessed for th e ir c o h eren ce and th e ir adequacy in expressing the religious consciousness. Such assessm ents, Proudfoot (1985:35, 36) rightly a rg u es, assu m e th a t they have a logical s tru c tu re a n d th a t relig io u s consciousness has a co n cep tu al co m p o n en t. No class o f b eh av io u r, including lin g u istic b e h a v io u r, can be d esig n a te d as ex p ressiv e w ith o u t q u a lific a tio n .
D epending on the context and circum stances in which it appears, it is expressive
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Faith, language and expcricncc only w hen it provides evidence th at w arrants an inference of som e belief, desire, e m o tio n , o r a ttitu d e . T o id en tify so m eth in g as an ex p ressio n is to o ffer an explanation of that phenom enon and regard it as evidence for the ascription of an intentional state. For Schleierm acher, though, the feeling o f absolute dependence is an original m om ent within the mind which cannot be explained away; for him this is of course not an argum ent for the validity of that feeling (Proudfoot 1985:38, 231) .
The recognition th a t religious language is not only constitutive, b u t often also expressive (shaped by certain affections), rem ains one o f S chleierm acher's contri butions to the study of religion. But it is not only the expressive, receptive medium he takes it to be. It also plays a very active and formative role in shaping emotions and religious experience (P roudfoot 1985:39, 40, 221; cf H ebblethw aite 1972:267; Van H uyssteen 1986:156-158) . Schleierm acher's strong emphasis on the role of experience in determ ining the content of C hristian doctrine would probably qualify for H ebblethw aite's critique (1972:263, 264 ) on the on e-sided ap p eal to experience which is o ften found in C hristology. H e finds th e claim to ex p erien ce in o rd e r to estab lish C h ristian doctrine inadequate and insufficient. By analysing the concept of experience and the scope o f ap p eals to ex perien ce, he shows th a t ap p eals to C hristian experience should never be expected to decide the credibility of Christian doctrine.
H ebblethw aite (1972:264) argues that the widespread tendency to take refuge in appeals to experience -after the collapse of the old au th o rities o f Scripture and tradition -has been too hasty. T hat is not the only resort when the old authorities have gone. In his article (1972:268, 275, 278) he suggests a positive alternative c rite rio n o f ra tio n a lity , nam ely, an a p p e a l to th e 'in n e r r a tio n a le ' (w hich I understand as the determ ining 'cosmological perspective' or life and world view -cf R ousseau 1986:57-63, 400-414) of the interpretative schem e o f C hristian doctrine, that is, its dynamic and creative ability to interpret experience in an intelligible way.
CON CLU SIO N T he concept of religion and the idea of religious experience are both products of m odem . W estern, largely Christian, thought of the past three centuries. They have developed during a perio d in which C hristianity has been criticised and rein te r p reted in th e light of m odern science, the recognition of the varieties o f religious b e lie f and p ra c tic e in o th e r c u ltu res, and th e co llap se o f th e a p p e a l to such traditional authorities as metaphysics, scripture, and ecclesiastical pronouncem ents (Proudfoot 1985:232) .
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H TS 46/3 (1990) S c h le ie rm a c h e r's arg u m e n t fo r th e au to n o m y o f religious ex p erien ce is a protective strategy built on an erroneous separation of religious life from ordinary belief and inquiry, which resulted in an artificial block to inquiry, and which would normally serve an apologetic purpose. TTiis resulted in the use of ambiguous terms like 'im m ediate', 'original', 'sense', and 'experience', each of which can be read in such a way as to capture the experience from the subject's point of view and remain neutral to the proper explanation of the experience (Proudfoot 1985:233,234 ).
S chleierm acher and his follow ers left us with th e h erm en eu tic challenge to com m unicate the dynamic experience of a relationship with G od in a way that will Instead of appealing to experience alone for either establishm ent, refutation or just the keeping alive of religious language and doctrine, the answer probably lies in the dialectic interplay of (1) previous interpretative schemes, (2) particular events (lik e th e C h ris t e v e n t -cf H ick 1969:34), an d (3 ) th e in d iv id u al an d g ro u p experience of the early church as well as our community today (cf H ebblethw aite 1972:267-278; Van Huyssteen 1986:177-187) . This could be a meaningful p art of an ongoing 'cum ulative a rg u m e n t' w hich m ight lead to explain in an increasingly a d e q u a te and cred ible way why it m akes sense to believe in th e living G od (cf Proudfoot 1985:43, 63, 69-74, 216-227) .
In o th e r w ords -as C h ristian b e liev ers we live in th e c o n sta n t h o p e and ex p ectatio n th a t th e Spirit o f G od will continuously inspire us to find relev an t methods and theories which will bring us nearer to experiencing and expressing in a valid and plausible way som ething of the paradox o f religious experience -that which in actual fact is beyond our understanding. HTS 46/3 (1990) 
